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Abstract: Using the reasoning that assumes that a pro-cyclical Solow re-
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manufacturing sector, we find that concentration and imports have a dif-
fering impact on the Lerner index across the business cycle. We find evi-
dence that shows that the Lerner index behaves anticyclically. And we
also make the analysis by type of good (durables and non-durables) and
find differing impacts of concentration and imports by type of good.
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Introduction
here is a long tradition in industrial organization that has studied
the determinants of price-cost margins1 A typical model would
establish the price cost margin as the dependent variable with concen-
tration indexes, the capital-output ratio and other variables as explanatory
variables. In this framework, the price-cost margin is calculated with
industry data, assuming that variable cost is an appropriate surrogate
for marginal cost. Also, this kind of studies has mainly used cross-
section observations.
More new approaches use the Solow equation (1959) to detect the
presence of market power. In this tradition, Hall (1988) states that
the finding of a pro-cyclical Solow residual is an implication of market
power. Under the assumption that the true Solow residual is not
intrinsically pro-cyclical, Hall has suggested an econometric method
that gives us an estimate of the markup.
This paper uses data obtained from the Encuesta Industrial Anual,
published by INEGI, to pool cross-section and time series observations
to estimate the Lerner Index, with the help of Hall’s methodology. In
contrast with traditional industrial organization approaches, the
measurement of the Lerner index does not assume a particular form
for marginal costs (similar to variable costs). Rather, the econometric
approach based on Hall’s methodology has sound basic principles. The
data used is at the four-digit level that allows us to study the price
setting behavior of industries that produce similar products. Previous
studies (Castañeda, 1996a, 1996b), have used two-digit data. These
data set may have included, in the same industry, rather dissimilar
products.
Similarly to the traditional industrial organization literature, the
paper introduces variables that affect this latter index, such as
concentration indexes and an import penetration index. The rationale
for using some of these variables emerges from one stage game theoretic
models. From these settings, we can obtain the following results: first,
a higher level of concentration has a positive impact on the (average)
Lerner index of the industry. Second, a reduction in protection through
quotas or tariffs diminishes the Lerner index. Finally, a change in the
elasticity of market demand changes the ability of firms to raise prices
T
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above marginal cost.2 Thus, this approach gives us the way some
industry variables affect the Lerner Index.3
The paper also allows for interaction between business cycle and
market structure variables. Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), and Athey, Bagwell
and Sanchirico (2002) argue that oligopolistic industries have varying
incentives to collude across the business cycle. A reason consistent with
these theories would predict that the impact of industry concentration
would not be stable across time. Also, the disciplining impact of imports
may vary across the business cycle because peso depreciations have
accompanied several downturns in the recent Mexican experience. We
investigate for these possibilities. The behavior of the Lerner index
across the cycle is also important for macroeconomics. Bils (1987) shows
that the Lerner index behaves anti-cyclically in the United States.
Several papers of imperfect competition in macroeconomics try to model
this situation.
Among the main findings are the following: For the 1986-1998
period, concentration has a positive impact on the Lerner index. Most
of the results show that the impact of concentration appears to behave
anti-cyclically for this period. This evidence is consistent with the
theories advanced by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger
and Harrington (1991). When controlling for pro-cyclical impacts, the
import-penetration ratio has a negative impact on the Lerner index.
The disciplining impact of imports behaves anti-cyclically. There are
also differing impacts of industry variables depending upon the type
of good (durables and non-durables).
Methodology
Let the technology be given by constant returns to scale production
function with no intermediate inputs:
2 See, for example, Ordover, Sykes and Willig (1982) and Waterson (1984). We are assuming
that international competition affects the price setting behavior of domestic firms by modeling
this fringe as competitive. A reduction in tariffs or the elimination of quotas affects the elasticity
of supply of this fringe and thereby diminishes market power. The so-called new industrial
organization (which is not new anymore) uses first order conditions of these types of games to
measure market power.
3 Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) predict that collusion may decrease whenever a quota is
established; the reason comes from the fact that the punishment from defection becomes smaller
whenever an industry experiences an import quota.168 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
Y(t) = F(L(t), K(t)A(t)) (1)
A(t) represents technical progress, L(t) represents labor input, K(t)
is the stock of capital and Y(t) is value added. Differentiating with
respect to time the last equation and rearranging:
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The dots over the variables denote derivatives with respect to time
and the sub-indexes express partial derivatives. Using Euler’s theorem
for homogenous functions and assuming homogeneity of degree 1 in
technical progress, the last expression can be written in the following
form:
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Define c, p and w as marginal cost, price and wages, respectively.
The first order conditions of a profit-maximizing firm that has some
degree of market power can be expressed in the following way:
FL = b(w/p)
b represents the markup (i.e. the ratio of price to marginal cost).
By using the last expression, condition (3) can be written in the
following way:
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Define the Lerner index as 
     
g=
- pc
p  with p representing price
and c marginal cost. Then 
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1
1 . Using the last expression, equation
(5) can be rewritten in the following fashion:
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Rearranging the last expression we obtain:
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Solow assumed that g = 0 in the last expression and calculated the
so-called Solow residual. In contrast, Hall assumed that A followed a
random walk with drift and used a similar equation to (4) to estimate
b (which implies a value for g). He advocated the use of instrumental
variables to solve for the potential endogeneity present in equation (6).
Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) estimated the last equation
for the U.S. manufacturing.
Define 
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. Then expression (6) can be written in the following way:
yk - alk =g yk + a(1 - g)( 6  )
We could estimate the last equation to obtain a measure of the price-
cost margin. The advantage of that approach would be that we would170 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
be estimating the Lerner index from first principles, without the need
to assume that variable cost is an appropriate surrogate for marginal
cost. The standard procedure would be either to use instrumental
variables as in Hall (1988), or an OLS approach as suggested by Ca-
ballero and Lyons (1989). Instrumental variables are used when
concerns about potential endogeneity of yk in (6’) are present. However,
we are interested in estimating the impact of industry variables on
the Lerner index, thus we substitute the price cost margin (g) by the
variables that affect it. So, the next step in our procedure is to make
the price cost margin (g) a function of industry specific factors. Among
them the following:
g = c + d1C4+d2M/TS (7)
With C4 denoting the four firm concentration ratio obtained from
INEGI and M/TS is the ratio of imports to total sales. Thus, substituting
(7) in expression (6 ) and proceeding with the estimation, we obtain
the estimates of these factors on the price-cost margin. After substi-
tuting (7) in (6 ) we get the following equation:
yk - alk = cyk + d1C4yk + d2M/TS yk + a(1 - g)( 6   )
Once we recover the values of d1 and d2 from (6  ), we can have an
estimate of the price cost margin from equation (7). To control for
cyclical behavior, a modified version of equation (7) (equation (7 )) is
also substituted in expression (6 ):
g = c + d1C4 + d2M/TS + d3DC4 + d4DM/TS (7 )
D is a pro-cyclical dummy.4 The resulting equation is:
yk - alk = cyk + d1C4yk + d2M/TSyk + d3DC4yk +
d4DM/TSyk + a(1 - g)( 6    )
We also estimate an equation that interacts the constant with the
dummy.
g = c + d1C4 + d2M/TS + d3DC4 + d4DM/TS + d5Dc (7  )
4 We will be more explicit about this variable later.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 171
Thus in an additional estimate, equation (7  ) is inserted in equation
(6 ). The resulting equation is:
yk - alk = cyk + d1C4yk + d2M/TSyk + d3DC4yk +
d4DM/TSyk + d5Dcyk + a(1 - g)( 6     )
We also adjusted the C4 index by the following expression:
C4  = C4(1 - M/TS) (8)
and make g a function of this C4 .
This approach gives us a better understanding of the determinants
of the price cost margins, while using a calculation of this that is
supported on stronger microeconomic foundations. In other words, we
do not need to calculate the price cost margins (as in other approaches)
by approximating the marginal cost with variable costs. In the proce-
dure listed above, we used Hall’s technique (that allows us to estimate
the price cost margin by using equation (6 )) and coupled this technique
with the traditional organization approach to obtain an estimate of
the determinants of the price-cost margin (the substitution of equation
(7), (7 ) or (7  ) into equation (6 )). Hall’s approach assumes a stochastic
behavior for technical progress (that it follows a random walk with
drift). We assume that behavior in equation (6 ) and use it to estimate
the parameters.5
Results
Expression (7) is inserted in equation (6 ), and we obtain an estimating
equation (6  )  of the determinants on price cost margins. We use data
from the Encuesta Industrial Anual published by INEGI. The data runs
from 1975 to 1998. We pool four-digit data for the whole manufacturing
sector to get panel estimates. We also got panel estimates for durable
and non-durable sectors.6
In Table 1 we show the results for all the manufacturing industries
pooled with fixed effects assumed for each industry. The table shows
the GLS estimates and the TSGLS estimates using, for these last set of
5 Thus, we do not need to measure technical progress but only assume its stochastic behavior.
6 See Appendix A.2 for the definitions.172 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
estimates, the rate of growth of gross domestic product (current and
lagged), the price of oil and the terms of trade as instruments. We
used the generalized least squares technique to account for potential
heteroscedastic effects, appearing because of the presence of cross-
section observations. All tables have weighted least squares and two
stage weighted least squares. These techniques estimate previously a
covariance matrix to use this as weight for the generalized least square
technique. TSGLS estimates are obtained to solve for the potential endo-
geneity problems present in equation (6 ) with regard to the variable yk.
However, Nelson and Starz (1988a, 1988b) have shown that there may
be significant biases for small samples and poorly chosen instruments.
The results of Nelson and Starz show me a tradeoff in the choice of the
estimation technique: if I choose instrumental variables, the results may
be biased in small samples but are asymptotically correct. On the other
hand, non-instrumental estimates are asymptotically biased but behave
better for small samples. Shea (1997) has also shown that instrumental
variables are not very appropriate if we have multiple parameters to
estimate. Given these arguments, I report in Table 1 the results for
GLS and TSGLS estimates. We include in Table 1 the variables C4 and
M/TS in an isolated fashion in order to avoid potential biases. However,
the reader must remember that the insertion of equation (7) (or 7 )
into equation (6 ) (equation (6  )), does not entail the inclusion of these
variables.
The literature has also expressed concern about the potential endo-
geneity present in equation (7) (and 7 ), modern industrial organization
approaches have criticized equations similar to (7) by questioning the
exogeneity of C4 and M/TS. To address this concern we present in
Appendix A.1 Hausman tests for Tables 1-4, shown in this paper. Ap-
pendix A.1 explains carefully how the tests are performed. As the reader
can verify, most of the tests do not reject the hypothesis of no endo-
geneity for the after-liberalization period.7 The coefficients shown in
Table 1 are obtained from equation (6  ).
The results show the expected signs for the after trade liberalization
period. For both TSGLS and GLS, market concentration increases the
price cost margin. For this period, we have that imports, although non-
significant, have a negative impact on the Lerner index. These are the
salient features of this table. The pre-liberalization (GLS) results show
7 Doubts may arise in relation to the explanatory power of the instruments used to construct
the Hausman tests; however, Table A.5 shows that the R2 and adjusted R2 for the instruments as
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a negative relation between concentration and market power, and the
impact of import-penetration is non-significantly positive.
Next we insert equation (7 ) and equation (7  ) into equation (6 ).
With the help of these estimates, we check for the behavior of these
variables across the business cycle. After completing this analysis, we
make an analysis by type of good.
In Table 2, we show the results of the pooled regressions for the
whole manufacturing sector. The regressions control for business cycles
impact by incorporating a dummy variable, which has the value of 1
whenever GDP is growing, and 0 if there is a recession (D indicates the
dummy variable in the table).8 As in Table 1, in regressing the modified
version of (6) (with 7  or 7   inserted) we include C4 and M/TS in an
isolated fashion, to avoid potential biases. The coefficients of equation
(6   ) and (6    ) are shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Pooled Regressions. Whole Manufacturing Sector
C4 * yk M/TS * yk M/TS yk Adjusted¨
C4 d1 d2 cR 2
1975-1998 GLS -0.0046 -0.024 -0.014 -0.008 0.91* 0.908147
(0.0095) (0.02) (0.033) (0.01) (0.012)
TSGLS -0.0031 0.0289 -0.081 -0.0071 0.841*
(0.0097) (0.040) (0.058) (0.011) (0.024)
1975-1985 GLS 0.058* -0.085* 0.0043 -0.062* 0.94* 0.966438
(0.02) (0.028) (0.085) (0.028) (0.016)
TSGLS 0.056* -0.062 -0.042 -0.058* 0.92*
(0.02) (0.042) (0.112) (0.027) (0.024)
1986-1998 GLS -0.032* 0.07* -0.014 -0.0007 0.87* 0.972887
(0.009) (0.022) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013)
TSGLS -0.033* 0.080* -0.041 -0.0023 0.863*
(0.009) (0.030) (0.04) (0.013) (0.018)
Note: Due to the use of instrumental variables, the adjusted R2 (Adjusted R2) for TSGLS is reported
on a per industry basis, thus we do not have an aggregate measure of goodness of fit. Number of
Observations: 1975-1998 = 1656; 1975-1985 = 759; 1986-1998 = 897. * Significant at 5%. **
Significant at 10%.
8 We tried with other business cycle variables like unemployment; however, we did not get
a good fitting.174 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
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(0.158)
(0.03)
(0.021)
(0.037)
(0.21)
(
m
2)
0.058*
-
0.001
-
0.017
-
0.059**
0.877*
-
0.14**
0.023
0.096*
(0.021)
(0.066)
(0.16)
(0.031)
(0.037)
(0.076)
(0.21)
(0.043)
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Table 2 shows two sets of regressions, depending upon which
equation is inserted (7  or 7  ) in equation 6 . In the first set, we in-
sert equation (7 ) (m1), we include the dummy only in an interactive
way, thus showing its interaction with C4 * yk (D * C4 * yk) and with
M/TS * yk (D * M/TS * yk). This procedure allows for potential changes
across time in the impact of imports, or the concentration index on the
Lerner index. For this set of regressions, we see that the interaction
effects appear to be significant after trade liberalization. As before, the
signs of the coefficients for concentration have the expected sign in
the 1986-1998 period. In contrast with Table 1, the impact of the import
to sales ratio is now significantly negative for the after liberalization
period. More foreign competition decreases the market power of
domestic firms.
The pro-cyclical variable interaction with the concentration index
shows that the impact of this variable on the index is anti-cyclical.9
For most cases (the whole period and the after liberalization period),
this variable is significant. As the economy moves into an expansion,
the impact of concentration on the Lerner index diminishes; the
opposite occurs in a recession. The evidence is consistent with the story
about price wars in booms (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger
and Harrington, 1991; Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico, 2002), concen-
trated industries may collude less in a boom to avoid the possibility of
defections; in a recession, the firms experience more collusion because
the incentive to deviate is less important. Also, for the after
liberalization period, the disciplining impact of imports is significantly
anti-cyclical; industries with high imports to sale ratio increase their
market power whenever there is a boom in the economy, and diminishes
this in a recession. This inference is valid for TSGLS and for GLS.
In the second set of regressions, we insert equation (7  ) (m2) and
we allow for an independent impact of the dummy variable on the
Lerner index (D * yk). The results are shown in the second line for each
period (m2). This inclusion changes the results. The inclusion appears
significant in the after liberalization period, showing that the Lerner
index is anti-cyclical. Second, some of the periods that showed
significance of the concentration variable before the inclusion of this
dummy (D * yk) loose the significance of this variable. However, for
the after liberalization period and for the whole period, the TSGLS
results indicate a significant effect of the concentration variable.
19 This assertion is not true for the 1975-1985 period.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 177
The results for the impact of the import-penetration ratio are similar
in model 1 (m1) and model 2 (m2). For the after liberalization period,
we have that for all models ((m1) and (m2)) and for all techniques (GLS
and TSGLS), the import-penetration variable has a negative impact on the
Lerner index. The dummy that accounts for the cyclical impact of con-
centration loose significance in model 2 (m2) for the after liberalization
period. However, the dummies for the impact of the import-penetra-
tion ratio keep their significance. The sign of this dummy shows that the
disciplining impact of imports is anti-cyclical. In booms, there is a lower
role for imports to affect the Lerner index; in recessions, imports have a
bigger role in disciplining the domestic firms.
In summary for model 2 (m2), the import-penetration ratio disci-
plines the price-setting behavior of domestic firms for the after liberal-
ization period (1986-1998). Also, for the after liberalization period, the
Lerner index shows anti-cyclical behavior. These last assertions are
valid for both techniques of estimation (GLS and TSGLS).10
As in Table 1, model 1 (m1) shows a negative impact of the concen-
tration index in the pre-liberalization period. However, model 2 (m2)
does not show a significant impact of the concentration index with regard
to the GLS technique. The import-penetration rate has a non-significant
effect for all models and all techniques of estimation for this period
(1975-1985).11
Notice that the technique used in this paper is useful in several
ways. First, we estimate the Lerner index at the industrial level with
stronger microeconomic foundations. Second, by exploiting the nature
of the data (cross-section with time series) we estimate the behavior
across time of this index. Traditional industrial organization ap-
proaches lack these two advantages. A typical industrial organization
regression will use similar variables that explain some measure of
profitability. However, they typically use cross-section data; thus, the
inferences yielded by this kind of approach will vary depending upon
the year of choice for running the regressions; inferences obtained in
years of expansion will be different from those obtained in times of
recession. Also, the price-cost margin typically used in this kind of re-
10 Thus it appears that the dummy (D * yk) is now picking the anti-cyclical behavior of the
Lerner index shown in model (m1) in the anti-cyclical impact of concentration.
11 Nonetheless, we must remember that we are referring to the pre-liberalization stage in
which imports are not significant and most of the imports were subject to quotas and tariffs. If
we model foreign competition as perfectly competitive firms competing internationally, then the
degree of competition that foreign import impinges on domestic price setting depends upon
the supply elasticity of foreign firms; if Mexico established quotas in this period, then the elasticity
of supply of imports is diminished considerably. Thus, we should not expect a disciplining impact of
foreign imports for this period.178 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
gressions is calculated directly from industry data; the technique
assumes that variable cost is an appropriate surrogate for marginal
cost. This shortcoming is absent in the approach followed in this paper.
The literature on the topic has incorporated the degree of foreign
competition directly into the concentration index, thus showing the com-
bined index in a single variable. We incorporate a modified concen-
tration index in which the concentration index incorporates directly the
import-penetration sales ratio and run a new model with only this index
considered. The new index is defined above in equation (8). A similar
expression can be obtained from standard one-stage non-cooperative
oligopolists with foreign competition,12 the difference lies in the con-
centration index used for this expression, while theoretical results would
yield an expression with the Herfindahl concentration index, equation
(8) uses the four firm concentration ratio.13 Notice that in this new
approach, the whole impact of foreign competition is being channeled
through the concentration index. Thus, a high degree of foreign
competition reduces the degree of concentration and, according to this
approach, will generate a lower Lerner index. In the former approach,
the impact of foreign competition on the Lerner index is independent
of the impact from concentration.
In Table 3, we insert equation (9) into equation (6 ).
g = c + lC4  (9)
A comparison between Table 1 and Table 3 will indicate that the
results are very similar, the concentration index adjusted for foreign
competition has the same sign for the three periods considered as the
unadjusted concentration index. For the after liberalization period,
the results for the two techniques of estimation are very similar. In
Table 4, we show the impact of cyclical variables on the adjusted C4
index (C4 ). We insert equation (10) into equation (6 ).
g = c + l1C4  + l2DC4  (10)
The impact of the adjusted concentration index on the markup is
similar to that found before (Table 2). For the 1986-1998 period, the
interaction term (D * C4  * yk) shows that the adjusted index has an
12 See Waterson (1984).
13 In fact, here we have the four plant concentration ratio.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 179
Table 3. Pooled Regressions. Whole Manufacturing Sector
C4  C4  * yk yk Adjusted
l cR 2
1975-1998 GLS -0.0012 -0.032 0.91* 0.959318
(0.0085) (0.021) (0.011)
TSGLS -0.0004 0.053 0.82*
(0.0086) (0.043) (0.023)
1975-1985 GLS 0.065* -0.092* 0.94* 0.966421
(0.018) (0.029) (0.015)
TSGLS 0.061* -0.043 0.89*
(0.017) (0.049) (0.027)
1986-1998 GLS -0.028* 0.068* 0.88* 0.972961
(0.009) (0.023) (0.012)
TSGLS -0.028* 0.079* 0.86*
(0.0095) (0.033) (0.017)
Note: Due to the use of instrumental variables, the adjusted R2 (Adjusted R2) for TSGLS is reported
on a per industry basis, thus we do not have an aggregate measure of goodness of fit. Number of
observations: 1975-1998 = 1656; 1975-1985 = 759; 1986-1998 = 897. * Significant at 5%. ** Sig-
nificant at 10%.
Table 4. Pooled Regressions. Whole Manufacturing Sector
C4  C4  * yk C4  * yk * D yk Adjusted
l1 l2 R2
1975-1998 GLS -0.0004 -0.009 -0.032 0.91* 0.959304
(0.008) (0.026) (0.021) (0.011)
TSGLS 0.0014 0.12* -0.079* 0.83*
(0.009) (0.04) (0.032) (0.021)
1975-1985 GLS 0.067* -0.14* 0.065* 0.94* 0.966794
(0.018) (0.035) (0.027) (0.015)
TSGLS 0.063* -0.1* 0.02 0.93*
(0.019) (0.05) (0.034) (0.024)
1986-1998 GLS -0.028* 0.13* -0.098* 0.88* 0.974565
(0.009) (0.027) (0.022) (0.012)
TSGLS -0.028* 0.16* -0.13* 0.87*
(0.0095) (0.035) (0.029) (0.015)
Note: Due to the use of instrumental variables, the adjusted R2 (Adjusted R2) for TSGLS is reported
on a per industry basis, thus we do not have an aggregate measure of goodness of fit. Number of
observations: 1975-1998 = 1656; 1975-1985 = 759; 1986-1998 = 897. * Significant at 5%. ** Sig-
nificant at 10%.180 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
Table 5. Pooled Regressions
C4 C4*yk M/TS*yk M/TS yk Adjusted
d1 d2 cR 2
Durables
1975-1998 GLS 0.011 0.13* 0.13* –0.007 0.76* 0.939030
(0.018) (0.035) (0.041) (0.013) (0.024)
TSGLS 0.009 0.15* 0.016 –0.007 0.72*
(0.018) (0.062) (0.072) (0.013) (0.041)
1975-1985 GLS 0.048 0.14* 0.16 –0.073* 0.75* 0.944945
(0.037) (0.058) (0.11) (0.037) (0.037)
TSGLS 0.042 0.21* 0.086 –0.074* 0.69*
(0.035) (0.071) (0.14) (0.036) (0.047)
1986-1998 GLS –0.0096 0.1* 0.037 0.011 0.81* 0.950069
(0.02) (0.042) (0.04) (0.022) (0.027)
TSGLS –0.0084 0.157* 0.025 0.015 0.76*
(0.021) (0.057) (0.058) (0.023) (0.038)
Non-Durables
1975-1998 GLS –0.022** –0.014 –0.16* –0.0048 0.97* 0.986155
(0.012) (0.016) (0.054) (0.015) (0.007)
TSGLS –0.013 –0.068 –0.13 –0.0043 0.95*
(0.012) (0.043) (0.1) (0.018) (0.022)
1975-1985 GLS 0.036 –0.0023 –0.43* 0.017 0.99* 0.991659
(0.028) (0.014) (0.13) (0.048) (0.009)
TSGLS 0.037 –0.035 –0.4* 0.007 1.0*
(0.028) (0.024) (0.19) (0.05) (0.015)
1986-1998 GLS –0.038* 0.056* –0.081** 0.0034 0.92* 0.984153
(0.011) (0.022) (0.045) (0.017) (0.013)
TSGLS –0.038* 0.039 –0.07 0.003 0.92*
(0.011) (0.033) (0.065) (0.018) (0.017)
Note: Due to the use of instrumental variables, the adjusted R2 (Adjusted R2) for TSGLS is reported
on a per industry basis, thus we do not have an aggregate measure of goodness of fit. Number of
observations for durables: 1975-1998 = 888; 1975-1985 = 407; 1986-1998 = 481. Number of
observations of non-durables: 1975-1998 = 768; 1975-1985 = 352; 1986-1998 = 416. * Significant
at 5%. ** Significant at 10%.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 181
anti-cyclical impact on the markup. Again, this evidence is consistent with
that found above. As the economy moves into a boom, concentrated
industries collude less to prevent a defection, in a recession there is
less incentive to deviate; thus, firms can collude more. For the after
liberalization period, the results for both techniques of estimation do
not differ significantly. We included a dummy interacted with yk, but
we did not find this variable significant.
Next we make the analysis by type of good —durable and non-
durable—. Table 5 reports the results for these categories. The
coefficients estimated are those from equation (6).
An interesting point to notice is that the constant of the markup
equation (yk) is larger for non-durable goods. The difference in the size
of the coefficients is much larger than two times the largest of the
standard deviations. A second point to notice is that, except for the GLS
estimate of the after liberalization period, concentration does not affect
(significantly) the Lerner index of non-durable goods; however, it does
impact (significantly) in a positive way the Lerner index of the durable
goods industries. This result is true for all periods considered and for
both techniques of estimation (GLS and TSGLS). A similar result was
found by Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) for the U.S.14 For
almost all models, the degree of foreign competition, as indexed in the
import to sales ratio, does affect the Lerner index of non-durable goods
in a negative way. More foreign competition reduces the domestic Lerner
index of non-durable goods.15 For durable goods, we have, for most results,
a positive non-significant impact of imports. Almost all the signs of the
impacts of the variables are similar for both techniques of estimation
(GLS and TSGLS).
To check for the impact of the business cycle on the model, we
incorporate in the analysis by type of good the dummy used in Table 2.
As explained before, the dummy takes the value of one, whenever GDP
is growing and the value of zero, whenever GDP is not growing. The
results with this interactive variable (D) are shown in Table 6. The coef-
ficients shown are those from equation (6   ) and (6    ).
Table 6 illustrates two models ((m1) and (m2)), as in Table 3 (m1)
corresponds to the insertion of equation (7 ) into equation (6 ) and in
(m2) we insert equation (7  ) into equation (6 ). The first model, (m1),
14 Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) did not use the same concentration index that
we are using in Table 5; they used the adjusted concentration index as defined in equation (8).
15 For some periods this impact is negative but statistically non-significant.182 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
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incorporates the dummy interacted only with the concentration index
(D * C4 * yk) and with the import penetration ratio (D * M/TS * yk).
In the second one, (m2), we added an additional dummy that enters
alone in the determination of the Lerner index (D*y k ).
As before (Table 5), when we compare the coefficient of yk (c in
equation (7)) between the two types of goods, we will find that this coef-
ficient is smaller for durables. For each period (1975-1998, 1975-1985 and
1986-1998) and for each model ((m1) and (m2)) the difference appears
quite significant.16
Second, the impact of concentration on the Lerner index appears
quite significant for durable goods. For all models, and for all periods
considered, concentration has a positive significant impact on the
Lerner index. Also, for durables, the inclusion of the additional dummy
(D * yk) in model (m2) does not change our basic inferences with respect
to the other coefficients of the regression. The sign of the coefficient of
the regressor, D * yk, for durables, when it is significant, shows that the
Lerner index for this type of goods is pro-cyclical. This inference is
valid for the whole period (1975-1998) and for the pre-liberalization pe-
riod (1975-1985). Additionally, we find that for durables and for
these periods (1975-1985 and 1975-1998), the dummy for the cyclical
impact of concentration becomes significant, every time the variable D * yk
is significant. When we control for the cyclical behavior of the index,
concentration affects the index in an anti-cyclical fashion.
For durables and for the after liberalization period, there is no sig-
nificant impact of D * yk. Thus we consider (m1) as more informative.
For this model and for this period (1986-1998), concentration has an
anti-cyclical impact on the Lerner index. As the economy moves into
an expansion, the impact of concentration on the Lerner index of durables
diminishes; the opposite occurs in a recession. Again, the story is consis-
tent with the idea of price wars in booms.
For the after liberalization period, and for model (m1), the impact
of concentration on the Lerner index appears to be smaller for non-
durable goods in comparison with durable goods.
For non-durables, we have indication that the import penetration
rate has a negative impact on the Lerner index only for the GLS
estimates of the whole period. Concentration has a positive significant
impact only for model 1 (m1) and for the after liberalization period.
Also, for this period and for this model, concentration has an anti-
16 By significant we mean that the difference in size of the coefficient for the same period is
several times the largest of the standard deviations of the coefficients.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 187
cyclical impact on the Lerner index. When we include the dummy
interacted with yk (D * yk), we loose significance of all the determinants
for the after liberalization period.
Concluding Remarks
For the 1986-1998 period, we find that concentration has a positive impact
on the Lerner index. Foreign competition has a negative, although
non-significant impact. When we control for pro-cyclical variables, we
find, for the after liberalization period, that imports have a significant
negative effect on the Lerner index. Also the impact of concentration
appears to be anti-cyclical; increases in concentration generate a more
anti-cyclical Lerner index. With respect to imports, we find, for the
1986-1998 period, that the disciplining impact of imports diminishes
in a boom. Industries with large imports to sale ratios have a larger
Lerner index in booms.
When we insert equation (7  ) in equation (6) (m2), we find that
the anti-cyclical impact of concentration is not significant anymore. The
dummy D * yk picks up the anti-cyclical impact now. However, in the after
liberalization period, the other estimates remain relatively robust when
moving from (m1) to (m2).
The distinction by type of good leads us to several interesting
conclusions. The impact of concentration appears very robust for
durable goods. For the after liberalization period, concentration has an
anti-cyclical impact on the Lerner index of durables. The higher the
level of concentration, the lower the Lerner index of durable goods in
a boom.
The Lerner index exhibits more response to changes in concen-
tration for durable goods than for non-durable goods. This happened
for the after-liberalization period.
In the agenda for future research lies the investigation of the differ-
ing impacts of aggregate demand and industry demand into the behavior
of the Lerner index. The dummy used here is a first attempt that
pretends to detect how the business cycle affects the Lerner index. A
further refinement of the sources of variability of demand is needed.188 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
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Appendix A.1. Endogeneity Test
As discussed in the text, there are potential endogeneity problems
present in the estimation process. These endogeneity problems have
been advanced with the advent of the so-called new empirical industrial
organization. Potential endogeneity problems pertain basically to the
concentration index and the import to sales ratio in equation (7) (or
(7 ) and (7  )). We restate equation (7) here:
g = c + d1C4 + d2M/TS + v (7a)
We included here the term v which represents the stochastic error.
The potential endogeneity refers to a lack of independence between
C4 and v and M/TS and v.
By substituting equation (7) into equation (6 ) we get:190 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
yk - alk = cyk + d1C4yk + d2M/TS yk +
a(1 - g) + vyk (10a)
In this section we implement Hausman specification tests for the
last equation and equations (6) and (6). Since we are applying
the endogeneity test in the last equation, we show in this part that if
E(ykv) = 0 and if E (yk2) ] π 0 then condition i) Cov (C4 yk, vyk) = 0 ﬁ
Cov (C4, v) = 0. Thus if we show that asymptotically Cov (C4yk, vyk)=0
then we expect that, asymptotically, Cov(C4,v) = 0, thus our Hausman
tests apply to the endogeneity problem present in equation (7a). The
assumption about E(ykv) = 0 is not restrictive, there is no a priori
reason to expect a correlation between the stochastic error of equation
(7a) and the growth of the output capital relation. Further, there is no
reason to expect the second moment of yk to be equal to zero (i.e. there
is no reason to expect that yk = 0 a.s.). The proof of condition i) is as
follows:
By hypothesis:
Cov(C4yk,vyk)=E(C4v yk2)-E(C4v yk) E(v yk)=0. But E(ykv)=0, thus
Cov(C4yk,vyk) = E(C4v yk2) = 0, but assuming independence of C4v and
yk we have that E(C4v yk2) = E(C4v)E(yk2) = 0; thus given that             Ey k () 2 0 π
we have that E(C4v) = 0. Now given that Cov(C4,v) = E(C4v) -
E(C4) E(v) and that E(v) = 0, we gave that Cov(C4,v)=E(C4v)=0 . Thus,
the Hausman test that shows that asymptotically Cov(C4yk, vyk) = 0
implies that asymptotically Cov(C4, v) = 0, which is the endogeneity
test that we want to apply. A similar reasoning applies for M/TS with
regard to endogeneity tests. The following tables apply the Hausman
Test to equation (10a), (6) and (6).
As explained in the main text, there is also a problem of potential
endogeneity with regard to the original Solow equation as expressed
in (6). In particular, there are concerns about the potential endogeneity
of the output capital ratio (yk) being endogenous in equation (6). In the
text we dealt with that problem by using instruments and thus
reporting in all tables the TSGLS and GLS estimates. We argued in the text
that we reported both sets of estimates due to the concerns expressed
by Nelson and Starz.
In the tables of this appendix we report Hausman tests for potential
endogeneity in equation (10a), (6) and (6), under the assumption
that yk is endogenous and we also report here Hausman endogeneity
tests under the assumption that yk is exogenous. Thus in the tableseconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 191
when we express instrumented yk, we refer to the case in which yk is
assumed as endogenous, and when non-instrumented yk is reported,
we are assuming that this variable is exogenous. As shown in most
tables, for the after liberalization process and under both modeling
paths for yk (yk exogenous and yk endogenous) we find that, for most
cases, we do not reject the hypothesis that C4 and M/TS are non-
endogenous.
The instruments for C4 are: C4 lagged one period, C4 lagged two
periods, capital-output ratio lagged one period, capital-output ratio lag-
ged two periods.
The instruments for M/TS are: M/TS lagged one period, M/TS lag-
ged two periods, capital-output ratio lagged one period, capital-output
ratio lagged two periods.
As shown in Tables A and B of this appendix, the instruments
appear to fare well for both variables.
Table A.1. Endogeneity Test for Table 1.
Whole Manufacturing Sector
Chi Square Marginal Significance Level
C4 M/TS C4 and M/TS together
1977- Non-instrumented yk 0.912336 0.007408 0.042523
1998 Instrumented yk 0.882738 0.006076 0.035224
1977- Non-instrumented yk 0.721603 0.0656 0.188326
1985 Instrumented yk 0.530679 0.053692 0.126018
1986- Non-instrumented yk 0.584786 0.481493 0.605509
1998 Instrumented yk 0.258872 0.457714 0.348814192 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
Table A.3. Endogeneity Test for Table 3.
Whole Manufacturing Sector
Chi Square Marginal Significance Level
C4*
1977-1998 Non-instrumented yk 0.002004
Instrumented yk 0.033146
1977-1985 Non-instrumented yk 0.021288
Instrumented yk 0.012473
1986-1998 Non-instrumented yk 0.073503
Instrumented yk 0.149486
Table A.2. Endogeneity Test for Table 2.
Whole Manufacturing Sector
Chi Square Marginal Significance Level
C4 M/TS C4 and M/TS together
1977 Non-instrumented yk m1 0.937625 0.007927 0.045487
-1998 m2 0.96115 0.005849 0.035423
Instrumented yk m1 0.951636 0.017707 0.087479
m2 0.947323 0.013598 0.069806
1977 Non-instrumented yk m1 0.830403 0.243589 0.529019
-1985 m2 0.825506 0.151555 0.38349
Instrumented yk m1 0.729538 0.244258 0.498817
m2 0.791432 0.140955 0.362819
1986 Non-instrumented yk m1 0.592511 0.49918 0.629143
-1998 m2 0.539616 0.589268 0.670915
Instrumented yk m1 0.447368 0.438216 0.479497
m2 0.391616 0.566879 0.547184economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 193
Table A.4. Endogeneity Test for Table 4.
Whole Manufacturing Sector
Chi Square Marginal Significance Level
C4*
1977-1998 Non-instrumented yk 0.001436
Instrumented yk 0.015603
1977-1985 Non-instrumented yk 0.076915
Instrumented yk 0.040466
1986-1998 Non-instrumented yk 0.100282
Instrumented yk 0.117210
Table A.5. R2 and Adjusted R2 for C4 as Dependent
Variable of the Instruments
R2 Adjusted R2
1977-1998 0.996492 0.996317
1977-1985 0.997942 0.997672
1986-1998 0.996341 0.996022
Table A.6. R2 and Adjusted R2 for M/TS as Dependent
Variable of the Instruments
R2 Adjusted R2
1977-1998 0.919528 0.915519
1977-1985 0.801168 0.775044
1986-1998 0.944696 0.939863194 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
Appendix A.2. Data
The data was obtained from the Encuesta Industrial Anual from 1980
to 1998. The data set includes 205 industrial classes. We took off several
classes for the following reasons: We needed classes that had infor-
mation on concentration indexes; we chose classes that did not produce
miscellaneous goods. Also, we found the data unreliable for classes
313040 and 321204. We kept 69 classes to run the regressions.
The classes are the following:
Class EIA 1994 Industrial Activity
311101 Meat packing, preservation and preparation
311201 Pasteurization and milk canning
311203 Dry and condensed milk
311301 Canned fruits and vegetables
311404 Wheat milling
311501 Manufacturing of cookies and pasta
311405 Manufacturing of corn starch
312110 Manufacturing of instant coffee
311701 Manufacturing of oils and butters
312200 Manufacturing of animal foods
311304 Fish and shellfish packing
311903 Manufacturing of chewing gum
312123 Manufacturing of starch and leaven
313041 Manufacturing of beer
313050 Soda production
314002 Manufacturing of cigarettes
Table A.7. R2 and Adjusted R2 for C4* as Dependent
Variable of the Instruments
R2 Adjusted R2
1977-1998 0.970951 0.969504
1977-1985 0.974156 0.970761
1986-1998 0.971578 0.969095economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 195
Textiles
321202 Yarn and textile tissues of soft fibers (cotton, wool and
synthetic fibers)
321205 Manufacturing of woolen cloth
321207 Finished of threads
Wood
331102 Manufacturing of wood
Paper
341010 Manufacturing of paper
341022 Manufacturing of cardboard
341031 Paper and cardboard containers
Chemical
351300 Cellulose and synthetic fibers
352100 Pharmaceuticals
352210 Varnish and lacquer
352221 Perfumes and cosmetics
352222 Soap and detergents
351215 Turpentine and tar
351222 Insecticides
352231 Adhesives
352240 Manufacturing of other products of rubber
355001 Manufacturing of tires
Glass and cement
362011 Flat glass and engraved glass
362013 Glass fiber and mosaics
362021 Glass containers and glass vials
362022 Manufacturing of other glass products
369111 Manufacturing of hydraulic cement196 Castañeda Sabido: Lerner Index
Another mineral products
361203 Manufacturing of bricks and non-refractory bricks
369124 Manufacturing of asphalt
Basic metal
371001 Manufacturing of iron and steel
371006 Manufacturing of iron pipes and posts
372003 Melting of cupper
372005 Melting of aluminum
Metal products
381300 Manufacturing of metal furniture
381401 Manufacturing of tools
381404 Manufacturing of metal wires
381407 Manufacturing of iron containers
381408 Manufacturing of glazier and enameling
381412 Galvanization, nickel-plate and chroming of prices
Machinery and equipment
382101 Manufacturing and assembly of agricultural machines
382202 Towing and crane machinery
382205 Fire extinguishers
382206 Manufacturing of electrical equipment and parts
382301 Manufacturing and assembly of machines for offices
383107 Manufacturing of batteries
383109 Manufacturing of another electrical accessories
383110 Manufacturing of light bulbs
383201 Manufacturing of LPs and radios
383202 Manufacturing of diverse equipments and electronic
appliance
383205 Manufacturing of records and tapes
Transport equipment
384110 Manufacturing and assembly of automobiles
384121 Manufacturing of chassis for auto vehicleseconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2006 197
384122 Manufacturing of engines for automobiles
384123 Manufacturing of vehicle transmissions
384124 Manufacturing of parts for the suspension of automobile
vehicles
384125 Manufacturing of parts for the braking systems of auto-
mobiles
383103 Manufacturing of parts for the electrical system of auto-
mobiles
Other manufacture industries
352233 Matches